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NOTES
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHILE UNDER THE EFFECTS OF NARCOTICS.-
With the introduction and subsequent startling widespread popularity
of the easily accessible marijuana, there has been a marked increase in
the use of narcotics in this country. Constant and thorough efforts on
the part of Federal authorities have failed to stem the rapidly mount-
ing number of hopelessly enslaved drug addicts. As a natural out-
growth of the weird effect of opiates upon the mind of their victim, the
number of unimaginably heinous crimes committed while under the
effects of various forms of narcotics have been greatly increased. Nar-
cotics dull, or entirely emasculate, the moral conscience of man.
Stripped of its inherent knowledge of right and wrong; of its fear of
society's expulsion for aberrant offenses against its standards, the ac-
celerated, ecstatic mind of the dope fiend finds no barriers between
it and the lustful passions and cravings characteristic of its depravity.
In the absence of definite, unalterable laws on the subject, a clever
lawyer is often able to create an honest doubt in the mind of a jury as
to the sanity of a person given to opiates. Generally his guilt is found
to be palliated by these circumstances, and after serving a short sen-
tence, the offender is again turned loose upon society. Occasionally he
is acquitted altogether by a sympathetic jury. It is a knowledge of
these facts which has led some legislatures and courts to the convic-
tion that the opiatic victim must be dealt with as severely as possible
under the circumstances of his case.
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Generally the liability of a person who commits a crime while under
the effects of dope can be placed in direct juxtaposition with that of an
individual who voluntarily takes liquor and, while under its power, in-
dulges in criminal action.' The sound opinion of a great majority of courts
is that temporary insanity or delirium begotten through the immoderate
use of morphine, cocaine, marijuana, or other drugs does not constitute
an excuse for crime.2 In the leading case of Sharp v. State 3 where the
defendant was charged with sodomy and sought acquittal on a defense
of insanity because of the excessive use of drugs, the court maintained
"if a man whose appetite controls his mind and will can commit a crime
with impunity because by the excessive use of drugs his moral nature
has been degraded and depraved, then under such circumstances the
law would certainly be open to a merited reproach." Certainly there
can be no injustice in holding a person responsible for his acts com-
mitted under these circumstances. It is a duty which every one owes
to his fellow members of society to preserve so far, as lies in his power,
the inestimable gift of reason. If by a voluntary act, he temporarily
casts off the restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done him
if he is considered answerable for any injury, which in that state, he
may do to others or to society.
It is to be noted, however, that the opinion of the majority relates
only to temporary insanity brought about by the immoderate use of
drugs. Obviously, the dictates of justice would rebel at punishing an
individual permanently insane because of narcotics or, for that matter,
any other reason. In a leading Georgia case 4 the court stated the gen-
eral principle, "if one voluntarily becomes intoxicated by the use of a
drug, this will not excuse him for the commission of crime. But if
mania or insanity, although caused by the use of a drug, be permanent
and fixed in character, so as to destroy the knowledge of right and
wrong as to the act, the person laboring under such infirmity will not
be responsible." The same rule appears in the words of a California
court, 5 "by statute 6 a temporary aberration of the mind caused by
voluntary intoxication induced by excessive use of liquor or narcotics
is not a valid defense to a charge of a crime, but to relieve one of re-
sponsibility it is necessary to prove that the brain has become per-
1 Commonwealth v. Cleary, 135 Pa. 64, 19 A. 1017, 8 L. R. A. 301 (1890);
Milburn v. Commonwealth, 223 Ky. 188, 3 S. W. 2d 204 (1928).
2 People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484 (1900); People v. Travers,
88 Cal. 233, 239, 26 P. 88 (1891); People v. Hower, 151 Cal. 638, 91 P. 507, 508
(1907) ; State v. Morris, 263 Mo. 339, 172 S. W. 603 (1915) ; State v. Huntley, 46
Mo. 414 (1870); State v. Miller, 93 Mo. 275, 6 S. W. 57 (1895); Perkins v.
United States, 228 F. 408 (1915); Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 452, 470 (1886);
Beck v. State, 76 Ga. 452, 470 (1886); Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550 (1884).
3 61 Ind. 383, 68 N. E. 286 (1903).
4 Strickland v. State, 137 Ga. 115, 72 S. E. 922 (1911).
5 People v. Lim Dum Dong, 78 P. 2d 1026 (1938).
6 Calif. Pen. Code § 22.
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manently affected thereby." It is clear, ergo, that it must be settled
insanity produced by recent use of narcotics which will relieve one of
the responsibility for his criminal act.
7
Unfortunately there is not unanimity on the liability of the criminal
who commits an offense while under the voluntary influence of narcot-
ics. Some jurisdictions that hold a man liable for acts committed while
under the effects of liquor refuse to rule similarly in cases involving
narcotics.8 In a leading Texas case 9 the court states "Pen. Code Art.
41, providing that the evidence of a temporary insanity produced by re-
cent voluntary use of intoxicating liquors is admissible in a criminal
case only in mitigation of punishment, or to fix the grade of murder,
does not include temporary insanity caused by the recent voluntary
use of cocaine or morphine." The same case maintains "it is the im-
perative duty of the court to do so instruct, and properly apply the
same to the facts in this case." In Commonwealth v. Whitney 10 the
court rules that voluntary use of chloroform, habitually indulged in,
and habitual intoxication therefrom, do not make a person a common
drunkard and expose him to the penalties prescribed by law therefor,
or for disorderly conduct. But a California statute 11 which "provides
that no act is less criminal by reason of the perpetrator- having been
in a state of voluntary intoxication" has been held not limited to in-
toxication from the use of liquor, but to include all forms of voluntary
intoxication.
12
In Texas if, because of the use of morphine or any other form of
drug, the mind of the offender is incapable of rational action, he is not
deemed responsible.1 3 In the leading case of State v. Rippy 14 the court
held "the fact that a person committing a homicide was in a frenzy
produced through the excessive use of morphine is a complete defense
on a prosecution thereof." In this-case the ruling of a lower court to
the effect that insanity must emanate from a disease of the mind in
7 People v. Hower, 151 Cal. 638, 91 P. 507, 508 (1907); People v. Fellows,
122 Cal. 233, 54 P. 830 (1898); People v. Bremer, 24 Cal. App. 315, 141 P. 222
(1914); People v. Goodrum, 31 Cal. App. 430, 160 P. 690 (1916); Beck v. State,
76 Ga. 452, 470 (1886); People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 72 Am. Dec. 484 (1891);
People v. Travers, 88 Cal. 233, 239, 26 P. 88 (1891).
8 Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 54 S. W. 589 (1899); Otto v. State,
47 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 80 S. W. 525, 122 Am. St. Rep. 682 (1904); Erwin v. State,
10 Tex. Cr. App. 700 (1881); Burkhard v. State, 18 Tex. Cr. App. 599 (1885);
Smith v. State, 19 Tex. Cr. App. 95 (1885); Hazelwood v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. R.
483, 186 S. W. 200 (1916); Phillips v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 481, 98 S. W. 868
(1906); Burton v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 493, 81 S. W. 742 (1904).
9 Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 54 S. W. 588 (1899).
10 11 Cush. 477 (Mass., 1853).
11 Calif. Pen. Code § 22.
12 People v. Sameniego, 118 Cal. App. 165, 173, 4 P. 2d 908 (1931).
13 Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 43 S. W. 112 (1897); Moss v.
State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 620, 124 S. W. 124 (1910).
14 State v. Rippy, 104 N. C. 752 (1889).
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some way, or from an act of Providence - "that it must be an in-
voluntary insanity produced by disease" - was condemned. The upper
court saying that "the distinction between insanity produced by disease
coming from an act of God, and that produced by man's own voluntary
act was not sound, as actual mental disease, amounting to insanity as
distinguished from ordinary intoxication, excuses even when brought
about voluntarily through dissipation or other vices." In Otto v. State 15
the court maintained that temporary insanity from the use of narcotics
is a separate defense, and it was a decided error not to instruct thereon.
It is obvious that with conflicting rulings as to the liability of an
offender who is voluntarily intoxicated, and one who is voluntarily un-
der the effects of narcotics, Texas should encounter difficulty in logically
disposing of a case where the offender was, at the same time, under
both the effects of intoxicants and narcotics. To put it mildly, it is con-
siderably difficult to distinguish whether the liquor or the dope caused
the temporary insanity under which the criminal was suffering at the
time of the criminal act. The Texas courts are forced to the conclusion
"that where insanity is produced by other causes, such as cocaine and
morphine, in conjunction with the recent use of intoxicating liquor,
an act done in such a state cannot be attributed solely to the use of
liquor." 16 In Phillips v. State,17 the court held that "a person who
commits a homicide while so insane from the use of morphine, or the
combined use of morphine and ardent spirits, that he does not know
what he is doing at the time, or that that which he does is wrong, should
be acquitted." It is, therefore, the paradoxical law in Texas that a man
who commits a crime while under the effects of liquor is guilty, but
the man who is more fortunate and is under the effects of both nar-
cotics and liquors may be acquitted.
The general principle that where the narcotics were administered
or prescribed by a physician there can be no liability on the part of
the patient is exemplified in the leading case of Perkins v. United
States -8 where the defendant was so frenzied by a dose of chloral in-
nocently taken under the direction of a physician as to be thrown into
a mental state placing him beyond his own control, and beyond realiza-
tion of what might be the effects of an overdose, he was not legally
responsible for acts committed while under the effects of the overdose.
The court stated that "this is true, even though the chloral might have
been harmless but for a settled state of mental disorder produced by
habitual drinking." Obviously, similar principles applied in a prosecu-
tion for murder where it was shown that the killing was committed
while the accused was insane from a drug administered to him without
his knowledge for the purpose of subsequently robbing him.1 9
15 47 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 80 S. W. 525 (1904).
16 Edwards v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 386, 43 S. W. 112 (1897).
17 50 Tex. Cr. R. 481, 98 S. W. 868 (1906).
18 228 F. 408 (1915).
19 Pribble v. People, 49 Colo. 210, 112 P. 220 (1910).
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It is the almost unanimous rule that there can be no liability predi-
cated where the use of narcotics negatives the existence of a specific in-
tent or knowledge which is an essential ingredient of the particular of-
fense charged.20 In a Michigan case 21 the court said "voluntary in-
toxication from liquors or drugs will not excuse acts which constitute
an offense. The criminal intent may be inferred, as a fact, from the acts.
But when the offense charged is an act combined with an intent to
commit an offense not actually committed, and the jury is satisfied
that the intoxication is of a degree which rendered the accused in-
capable of entertaining the particular intent charged, and he had no
such intent prior to the intoxication, nor any knowledge that he was
liable, when intoxicated, to such a condition of mental disorder as
would render him capable of the offense charged, they must acquit."
A Kentucky court 22 maintained that "our courts have drawn a dis-
tinction between cases where the act constitutes the defense and cases
where there must be combined with the acts done the intent of the ac-
cused, in order to constitute the offense in the former it being held
that such a defendant may show that he was unconscious at the time,
or too drunk to have an intent." It is to be noted, however, that al-
though the defendant's mind is beyond his control, and strictly he can-
not be said to have the required specific intent at the time of the com-
mission of the crime, the defendant may not be absolutely absolved
of his liability.23 In a Pennsylvania case 24 it was stated that "even
though there is intoxication there may be deliberation and premedita-
tion, and if the evidence shows these elements of murder, the intoxica-
tion will not reduce the murder to the second degree," and in State v.
Quigley 25 "where intent to do a criminal act charged must be proven
and insanity is not pleaded, but voluntary intoxication, whether by
alcohol or drugs, is pleaded as a defense, the jury, if not satisfied of
the presence of specific intent, may find the accused guilty of a lesser
crime rather than not guilty." In Wilcox v. State 26 the court pro-
nounced that jurisdiction's rule, "It is admissible to show defendant's
immoderate use of drugs or whiskey, not to excuse the crime, but to
20 Terhune v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 370, 138 S. W. 274 (1911); Keeton
v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 522, 18 S. W. 359, 13 Ky. L. Rep. 748 (1892); Kehoe
v. Commonwealth, 149 Ky. 400, 149 S. W. 818 (1912); State v. Fiske, 63 Conn.
388, 28 A. 572 (1893); State v. Di Guglielmo, Del. Gen. Sessions, 4 Pennewill, 336,
55 A. 350 (1903); State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 P. 727 (1930) ; People v. Her-
rin, 295 I1. App. 625, 15 N. E. 2d 598 (1938); People v. Brisbane, 295 ll. 241,
129 N. E. 185 (1920); Crosby v. People, 137 III. 325, 27 N. E. 49 (1891).
21 Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 385 (1869).
22 Williams v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 653, 68 S. W. 871, 24 Ky. Law. Rep.
465 (1902).
23 Commonwealth v. West, 204 Pa. 68, 63.A. 542 (1902); Commonwealth
v. Eyler, 217 Pa. 512, 66 A. 747, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 639 (1907).
24 Commonwealth v. Detweiler, 78 A. 270 (Pa., 1910).
25 199 A. 274 (Me., 1938).
26 28 S. W. 312 (Tenn., 1894).
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illustrate the mental condition with a view to fixing the degree of the
crime when it depends upon deliberation and malicious purpose."
We now come to one of the most perplexing, urgent, and grossly
mishandled problems in the entire criminal law field, namely, that of
the dope addict. Irrespective of previous voluntary usage having re-
sulted in the acquisition of the habit, where the accused is an addict
unable to control his horrific craving he is not deemed to be a volun-
tary user at the time of the commission of a crime. In Perkins v. United
States 27 it was held that "the long continued use of drugs, though
voluntary, may produce delirium tremens, or other mental derange-
ment, violent enough to amount to temporary insanity, and make its
victim not responsible under the law for offenses committed by him."
In Prather v. Commonwealth 28 where the defendant was prescribed
morphine as a form of relief from pain following an operation, and had
continued the use of the drug until he was now an addict and con-
sumed eight to twenty grains daily, it was held "in prosecution for
fraudulent conversion of trust funds, the instruction that the jury
could not acquit for insanity which arose from a voluntarily acquired
morphine habit was error," notwithstanding the fact that the defend-
ant admitted that at the time of the trial he was cured of the drug
addiction, and was of sound mind. An Indiana case 29 held "evidence
as to what effect deprivation of an accustomed supply of opium would
have upon the mind of the accused is admissible in a prosecution for
larceny, when it appeared that he was addicted to the habitual and
excessive use of opium in some of its forms, and there was evidence
from which it might be inferred that at the time of the crime he had
been deprived of his accustomed supply.
In Texas where the voluntary, non-addicted user of narcotics is not
guilty if at the time of the commission of an offense he was under the
influence of a drug, and in some cases where because of the lack of the
necessary specific intent, or where because of drug addiction the vic-
tim is not guilty, the actual, or probably soon-to-be addict is permitted
to go free. It is true as stated by a Kentucky court 30 that "it is com-
mon knowledge that morphine addicts have a desire to stop using the
drug but are unable to resist the craving." But it is also unfortunately
a maxim that very few addicts possess the inestimable will-power and
physical stamina necessary to throw off their horrible curse. Often be-
cause of the state's inability to predicate criminal liability for the of-
fense of the drug slave, the addict is turned loose upon society, as gen-
erally he can't be sent to an asylum because for the great majority of
the time he is entirely lucid. But it must be equally of common knowl-
edge that when unsatisfied cravings have been endured for a compara-
27 228 F. 408 (1915).
28 215 Ky. 714, 287 S. W. 559 (1926).
29 Rogers v. State, 33 Ind. 543 (1870).
30 Prather v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 714, 287 S. W. 559 (1926).
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tively lengthy period, or when upon being satisfied, the distorted opiatic
mind is morally indifferent, but fiendishly clever and courageous, the
addict will once again commit an offense against innocent members of
society. Legislatures and courts must realize their responsibility to
protect society against the dope-fiend menace. Criminal lawyers, through
whose skilled efforts many such would-be maniacs are set free, must
see that fundamental legal ethics compel them to cooperate in handling
the dope slave. Measures and policies must be enacted which will segre-
gate the drug addict from the rest of society. This segregation must not
be temporary, not merely a pretense. The addict must be cared for
and given all possible treatment until all, even the slightest scintilla of
his affliction has vanished. Only in this manner can the staggering num-
ber of crimes committed by dope slaves be decreased.
John J. Killen.
FEDERAL Ai4D STATE IMMUNITY FROm TAXATION. - To what extent
does our dual system exempt one sovereign from taxation by the other?
The answer to this question becomes ever more complicated with the
expansion of our State and Federal Governments, and it is the purpose
of this article to point out the recent decisions of the courts as a guide
to a possible answer to this question.
The early case of McCulloch v. Maryland' is the root from which
most subsequent cases involving the immunity of our dual governments
from taxation by the other government have branched. The facts of
this case are substantially these: the Federal Government established
a branch of the Bank of the United States in Maryland. Subsequently,
the state of Maryland passed an act by the state Legislature subjecting
all banks not chartered by the state to a tax on their bank issues. The
court found that the Federal Government had the power to establish
a bank, and since the right to establish a bank was a governmental
function, "The states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to re-
tard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
power vested in the general government." The court, discussing the
right of a state to lay this tax, says, "That the power to tax envolves
the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render
useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance, in con-
ferring on one government a power to control the constitutional meas-
ures of another which other with respect to those very measures is de-
dared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions
1 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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not to be denied." After this decision, the principle that a state
government could not tax an instrumentality of the Federal Govern-
ment was recognized.
Shortly after the Civil War another case of significance was decided,
namely Collector v. Day.2 Here the court exempts a state Judge from
Federal taxation. The court found that an instrumentality of the state
government should be exempt from Federal taxation. It is interesting
to note that this case was decided at the close of the war between the
states when the state governments were in a weakened state, and this
decision served to increase the power of the state sovereignty.
But, these two decisions have formed a basis from which a long line
of decisions recognizing the doctrine of immunity of our dual govern-
ments from taxation of the other's governmental functions.
As our country has expanded, the branches of our State and Federal
Governments have reached into new fields of control and many prob-
lems concerning the taxation of these Sovereigns have arisen.
In the case of Dobbins v. Commissioner 3 it was held unconstitutional
for a state to tax a federal employee, as the employee was an instru-
mentality of the Federal Government, and since the Federal Govern-
ment was exempt from state taxation, the instrumentalities of the Fed-
eral Government should also be exempt. Later, in the case of Rogers
v. Graves 4 where the Federal Government operated the Panama rail-
way, it was held that the employees of said railway were exempt from
state taxation on the theory that the railway and its employees were
instrumentalities of the Federal Government and also exempt from
state taxation. The court says, "... the Railroad Company being im-
mune from state taxation, it necessarily results that fixed salaries and
compensation paid to its officers and employees in their capacity as
such are likewise exempt."
But, in the case of Helvering v. Powers 5 in answer to the question
of whether the compensation of the members of the board of trustees
of the Boston Elevated Railway Company was exempt from Federal
income tax on the basis that the trustees were officers of the state and
instrumentalities of its governmental function, the court held that the
state was not acting in a governmental capacity and thus the Federal
government could tax a proprietary function of the state. The same
interpretation was adhered to where the state was operating a liquor
store. 6
2 11 Wall 113 (1871).
3 16 Peters 435 (1842).
4 299 U.S. 401 (1936).
5 293 U. S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171 (1934).
6 South Carolina v. U. S., 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110 (1905).
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It is an established rule that where a state operates in its govern-
mental capacity, the state functions and instrumentalities are exempt
from Federal taxation; but where the state operates in a proprietary
function these actions are subject to Federal taxation.
7
However, in the case of the Federal Government every function of
this sovereignty is governmental in character. The reason for this
conclusion is that the Federal Government is a government of Delegated
poWers and has only those powers which are specifically delegated - all
of which are solely governmental.8 But, the state governments have
all powers which are not specifically granted to the Federal Govern-
ment.9  Thus, the state governments may operate in a proprietary func-
tion as well as a governmental function.
But, even where governmental functions are involved it is necessary
to show that the person or thing to be exempt is a part of the govern-
mentality which is immune from taxation by the other sovereignty.
Thus, it has been held that an independent contractor is not exempt
from taxation.1 0
Early cases went far to exempt every instrumentality of a govern-
mental capacity from taxation by another sovereignty. In the case of
Bush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" the court held that a city
water department was a governmental function, and that the chief en-
gineer of the Bureau of Water Supply was exempt from a Federal in-
come tax because the chief Engineer was an officer and as such he was
exempt from the Federal taxation.
From these early decisions it is evident that the courts were prompted
to exempt every instrumentality of a sovereignty from taxation by the
other government.'
2
But, in the year 1938 a new trend was initiated. The Federal courts
began to show a tendency to allow a more liberal interpretation of the
immunity doctrine which has been discussed. This new trend found its
inception in the case of Helvering v. Gerhardt.13 In this case it was
held that a state employee was not exempt from a Federal income tax.
This result is the antithesis of the decision in Collector v. Day 14 and
cases following that early decision. Prior to the Gerhardt Case the
7 Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 337, 54 S. Ct. 725 (1934).
8 Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark Lumber Co., 62 S. Ct. 1 (1941).
9 Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725 (1934).
10 Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172 (1926). Boeing
Airplane Co. v. State Commissioner of Revenue and Taxation, 113 P. 2d 110 (Kan.
1941).
11 300 U. S. 352, 81 L. Ed. 691, 57 S. Ct. 495 (1937).
12 Governmental Owned Corporation and Intergovernment Tax Immunity,
Walter Freeman, 34 Wash. L. Q. 46 (1938-9).
Is 304 U. S. 405, 82 L. Ed. 1427, 58 S. Ct. 969 (1938).
14 11 Wall 113 (1871).
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court had assumed that taxation on any instrumentality of a state
government operating in a governmental capacity was a burden on the
government. However, in the latter case applies some new reasoning,
namely that each case must be determined on its facts to ascertain
whether or not there is an actual burdening of the government by the
tax. Applying this reasoning in the Gerhardt Case, the court found
that any burden on the state government was far to incidental to ob-
struct or destroy the state sovereignty, and as a result of this conclusion
the court found that the employee must pay the tax.
The following year in 1939 another important case was decided,
Mark Graves v. People.15 In this case a New York income tax was
held to be collectible against an employee of the Home Owners' Loan
Corporation. The court followed the Gerhardt Case in reasoning that
it must be shown that a burden on the government instrumentality
exists in order to afford an exemption from taxation. The court says
that an intention on the part of Congress to confer on employees of a
corporate instrumentality of government created by it an immunity
from state taxation of their salaries is not to be gathered by implication
from the silence of the statute creating the instrumentality. The court
also points out that one should look to the Constitution for a license
for immunity rather than to the earlier cases. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
says, "The judicial history of this doctrine of immunity is a striking
illustration of an occasional tendency to encrust unwarranted inter-
pretation upon the Constitution and thereafter to consider merely what
has been judicially said about the constitution rather than to be
primarily controlled by a fair conception of the constitution. . . .But
the ultimate touch stone of constitutionality is the constitution itself
and not what has been said about it."
Since, the decision of these cases involving immunity of government
instrumentalities, a recent case 16 where an attorney for the New York
Superintendent of Insurance sought to recover income tax paid to the
Federal Government on the theory that he was under the Public Salary
Tax Act 17 held that the attorney was not exempt from the tax by the
Act as the relation in this case was attorney and client and not an
((employee" as set out in the Act.
Another case 18 holds that a railroad which carries mail is not ex-
empt from a state income tax. The railroad is deemed to be an em-
ployee of the Federal Government and the court applies the rule of
Graves v. New York 19 saying, "This compensation, when paid becomes
private income, usuable for the corporate purposes for which it was
15 83 L. Ed. (adv. 577), 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
16 Burke v. McGowan, 39 F. Supp. 174 (1941).
17 26 U. S. C. A., Int. Rev. Code § 22 (1939).
18 Western Ry. of Alabama v. State, 3 So. 2d 9 (1941).
19 83 L. Ed. (adv. 577), 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
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created by the state .... We are at the conclusion that as regards the
immunity of this income from state income tax, the railroad company
is to be deemed a servant or employee of the Federal Government."
Also, in the case of Peisker v. Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission 20 the court finds that a state can tax property of an individual
contractor selling a commodity to the government, measured by Gross
Receipts, including receipts from performance of a government contract,
or can tax contractor's net income, including income derived from con-
tracts with the government, and can require payment of license or oc-
cupational tax against the contention that the contractor is an instru-
mentality of the government of the United States.
In the case of the First State Bank of Gainsville v. Thomas 21 a
state bank was declared to be a state instrumentality by statute. The
court held that the bank had to pay an excise under the Social Security
Act on the ground that a state bank was a proprietary function of a
state and thus subject to Federal taxation. Other cases have held the
Federal Land Bank is not subject to state taxes imposed on the fore-
closure of a mortgage,2 2 and a gasoline tax levied by a state on a Fed-
eral instrumentality was unconstitutional. 23 Another interesting case 24
holds that a receiver appointed by the United States foreclosing a
mortgage stands in the same position as the ordinary suitor; and here
the agent foreclosing the mortgage is not immune from state taxation
as an instrumentality of the Federal Government. The court render-
ing its decision says, ".. . the implied immunity of one government and
its agencies from taxation by the other should be narrowly restricted."
In the recent case of Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark
Lumber Company 25 the question was whether the Federal Land Bank
is exempt from state taxation when Congress has specifically exempted
the Federal instrumentality by statute. The court says, that Congress
can constitutionally immunize from state taxation activities in the
furtherance of the lending functions of the Federal Land Banks. The
court here says, "It follows that when Congress constitutionally creates
a corporation through which the federal government lawfully acts, the
activities of such a corporation are governmental (citations) .... Con-
gress has the power to protect instrumentalities which it has constitu-
tionally created."
20 115 P. 2d 62 (1941).
21 38 F. Supp. 849 (1941); Odland v. Findley, 38 F. Supp. 563 (1941).
22 Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. D. W. Crosland, 261 U. S. 374, 6V
L. Ed. 703, 43 S. Ct. 385, 29 A. L. R. 1 (1923).
28 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 72 L. Ed. 857, 48 S. Ct.
355 (1928).
24 The Southern Cross, 120 F. 2d 466, 31 F. Supp. 549 (1941).
25 62 S. Ct. 1 (1941).
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In a recent case 26 a sales tax was levied on one who had purchased
lumber with which to build an army camp for the Federal Govern-
ment. It was alleged that this tax infringes the immunity of the United
States from State taxation. The Court in holding that the tax was
valid pointed out that there was no legislation immunizing the defend-
ant, and in the absence of such legislation the constitution alone does
not afford immunity to these contractors. The court says, "So far as
such non-discriminatory State taxation upon the contractor enters into
the cost of the material to the Government, that is but a normal incident
of the organization within the same territory of two independent tax-
ing sovereignties." In the case of Curry v. United States 27 the same
decision was reached in regard to a state use tax.
Briefly reviewing the decisions, one is at once aware that the courts
have come a long way since the historic case of McCulloch v. Mary-
land 28 and Collector v. Day.29 When the former case was decided the
country was young and the Federal Government was comparatively
weak. There was a great fear that perhaps the state governments would
restrict the Federal Government and perhaps make the latter a mere
"puppet government." Thus, to insure the Federal Sovereignty Mar-
shall was led to a strict interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States when he held that Federal instrumentalities were immune from
state taxation. However, since Marshall's time a great change has
come over these United States. The scope of Federal powers has in-
creased tremendously - especially in the last few years. Also, the
Federal Government has employed many more persons to carry out the
administrative functions of the Government.
The state governments have also broadened out since the decision
of Collector v. Day.8 0 When the latter case was decided the country had
just recovered from the war between the states and the court felt obli-
gated to "bolster" states rights, and as a result granted immunity from
Federal taxation to all governmental functions and instrumentalities
of the states.
The scope of this immunity has been limited by recent decisions.
First, it is now well settled that government employees must pay income
taxes. 31 In regard to Federal Judges there is a constitutional provision
which forbids the salaries of Judges to be diminished.32 However, it
is conceivable that an income tax would not depreciate the salaries as
such a tax is not on the salary but on the net income of the Judge.
26 State of Alabama v. King and Boozer, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941).
27 62 S. Ct. 48 (1941).
28 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
29 11 Wall 113 (1871).
80 11 Wall 113 (1871).
81 Graves v. New York, 83 L. Ed. (adv. 577), 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
32 Art. I Sec. 8.
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The courts rationalize 'these employee cases by saying that the tax is
not levied on the instrumentality of a government but rather on an
individual, and second the courts say that even if the tax on the in-
dividual would affect the instrumentality of a sovereignty, the effect
would be so indirect and incidental that it must be excluded from
immunity.
The courts have also excluded contractors engaged in Government
projects even tho the work is done for the Federal Government under
government supervision and government contracts and the Government
has contracted to re-imburse the contractor for all expenditure. 33
A discriminatory tax on a governmental instrumentality is conclusive-
ly unconstitutional,3 4 but a non-discriminatory tax is not in the same
category. The courts have shown a tendency not to exempt the tax on
a governmental instrumentality unless Congress has passed a statute
exempting the instrumentality from taxation. 35 This is in accord with
the policy of the courts to favor taxation by the states. However, under
the latter principle it must be said that the principle is limited to cases
where the tax only incidently affects the instrumentality of the govern-
ment and there is no serious harm such as destruction of the instru-
mentality.
But, the author submits that it is not beyond the realm of possibility
that the courts might allow a non-discriminatory tax to be levied directly
on one government by another government. For, the whole scheme of
sovereignty immunity from taxation is based on judicial fiat and not
on any constitutional principle. This theory of sovereignty has de-
veloped from Marshall's obiter dicta in McCulloch v. Maryland,3 6 the
power to tax is the power to destroy, rather than from the Constitution
itself. To bolster this concept it seems pertinent to reiterate Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's statement in a recent case,3 7 "The judicial history of
this doctrine of immunity is a striking illustration of an occasional
tendency to encrust unwarranted interpretations upon the Constitution
and thereafter to consider what has been judicially said about the Con-
stitution, rather than to be primarily controlled by a fair interpretation
of the constitution .... But the ultimate touch stone of constitutionality
is the constitution itself and not what has been said about it." Further,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter agrees with Mr. Justice Holmes that the power
to tax is not the power to destroy while this court sits.
In view of the fact that the doctrine of McCullock v. Maryland 38
has been severely shaken by recent decisions it is not beyond specula-
33 State of Alabama v. King and Boozer, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941).
84 In re Kentucky Fuel Gas Corp., 37 F. Supp. 639 (1941).
85 Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismark Lumber Co., 62 S. Ct. 1 (1941).
36 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
37 Graves v. New York, U. S. 83 L. Ed. (adv. 577), 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
88 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
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tion to suppose that one day the courts may openly allow one sovereignty
of our dual system to tax the governmental functions of the other
sovereignty if the court finds that the tax is not destructive or dis-
criminatory.
The present trend of the courts is to restrict the "immunity doctrine"
and the future may see complete abolishment - for the author submits
that it is within the power of the courts to reach this conclusion.
James H. Neu.
RIGHTs AcQUIRED BY ONE WHO, FOR A CONSIDERATION, LEASES
LAND OR WALL SPACE FOR ADvERTISING PURPOSES.-The legal status
of one who leases the land or wall space of another for advertising pur-
poses is a problem of ever increasing importance. The purpose of this
article is to point out the general legal principles in regard to this ques-
tion, and a discussion of the law in Ohio, Illinois, and Michigan on this
question.
The leading case on this question would seem to be stated in the
Iowa case of Thomas Cusack Company v. J. R. Meyers.' In that case,
both plaintiff and defendant were engaged in the business of advertis-
ing and sign painting. Plaintiff had contracted in 1917 with various
owners or occupiers of buildings for the right to paint signs on the
walls. In 1918, Defendant entered into a series of like contracts to
paint signs on the same walls. In all cases, there was a good considera-
tion paid. The Defendant painted his signs over Plaintiff's signs, and
affixed the name of the Defendant company thereto. Thus the court was
put in the position where it must decide whether the agreement be-
tween the Plaintiff and building owners created a mere naked license,
or a contract in the nature of an easement. The court held that as the
contracts between the Plaintiff and building owners were based on a
good consideration and fully performed by the Plaintiff they were not
revocable at the will of the grantor. It is the court's opinion that such
an agreement gives rise to a contract in the nature of an easement.
But this is not the situation in all states, and the problem is not
clearly settled. In England, the court held that a contract for the use
of a wall for advertising purposes was a mere license. 2 The state of
New York court is strong in its opinion that such a contract is not a
lease, and does not establish the relation of landlord and tenant.
Now that we have seen the various stands the states have taken on
this question, let us try to determine what an Ohio court might de-
1 189 Ia. 190, 178 N. W. 401, 10 A. L. R. 1104 (1920).
2 King v. Aien and Sons Biposting, 2 A. C. (Eng.) 54, 114 L. T. N. S. 762
(1916).
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cide if the question were put before it.3 An easement is a liberty,
privilege, or advantage in land without profit existing distinct from
the ownership of the land, and because it is a permanent interest in
the land of another with the right to enter at all times and enjoy it,
it must be founded upon a grant by writing, or upon prescription which
presupposes a grant. A license is an authority to do a particular act or
a series of acts upon the land of another without possessing any estate
therein. It is founded in personal confidence, is not assignable, requires
no writing, and is revocable at the will of the party giving the license.
Since these definitions are so closely associated, it is important to
determine whether a right created in each particular case is an ease-
ment or license. A paragraph in the Cornell Law Quarterly 4 says that
if the instrument creating the right is a formal document under seal,
there should be a presumption that an easement was created. Since the
parties have taken the trouble to put their agreement in formal writing,
they must have intended to convey something of binding effect. People
know that parol agreements are often forgotten. Secondly, it is im-
portant to observe the language in the instrument. If words are used
which are ordinarily used in conveying an interest in land, as distin-
guished from a mere license, the court will be more justified in finding
that an easement was created than if there is a total absence of such
words. But the technical words of grant should not be indispensable.
The fact that a consideration was paid for a right will not distinguish
an easement from a license, but the absence of any consideration would
be some evidence that only a license was intended to be given. If words
of succession are used, it is evidence of an intent to create an easement,
since a license is personal and not assignable.
It would be my conclusion that the Ohio courts would not call this
right to use the premises of another an easement in gross, unless that
right existed for the benefit of some adjoining land, that is, a dominant
tenement. Some states allow the running of the burden or benefit of
easement in gross, and thus the right may be logically recognized as
such. But in Ohio, the benefit of easements in gross is not allowed to
run, and such a right is not inheritable, and not assignable; it is a
right personal to the grantee the court found in the case of Isaac Boat-
man v Matthew Lasley.5 However, the easement is still a more valuable
property right than a mere licenserbecause the license creates no rights
as against third parties.
Nor would they call this right a lease, even though the parties called
themselves "lessor" and "lessee." The New York court in Goldman v.
New York Advertising Company6 said that if it were considered a
3 Fowler v. Delaplain, 79 0. S. 279, 87 N. E. 260 (1909).
4 10 Cornell Law Quarterly 65 (1924-25).
5 23 0. S. 614 (1873).
6 29 Misc. 133, 60 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1899).
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lease, then all the incidents of leasehold interests would attach. But the
contract between the parties was not one for the exclusive possession
and profits of lands or tenements, and no estate passed to the lessee. It
was merely an irrevocable license for an agreed period.
I believe the Ohio courts would call this right an irrevocable license.
The right to paint a sign on lessors wallspace for a consideration, gives
the lessee the right to do one particular act on the premises of the lessor,
and no other; this is identical with the right given by an irrevocable
license. Such license does not create an interest in land which binds
the assignee of the licensor. The licensor is bound merely by a personal
obligation to allow the licensee to use the wall for advertising purposes.
The only two Ohio cases which pertain to this question are not direct-
ly in point, as was mentioned above. The case of the Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Company v. The Loomis Realty Company and the B. F.
Goodrich Company 7 decided that the right to place signs on the out-
side walls of demised premises, is appurtenant to the premises and be-
longs to the tenant. And that an agreement in a lease of part of a build-
ing that there shall be no signs placed on the building irk the space for
signs in the front, and except that the tenant is given the exclusive
right to place its own sign on the west side of the building is a covenant
on the part of the lessor, as well as a restriction upon the rights of the
lessee.
The case of Law and Gansel v. Haley, Poole and Company 8 decided
that a tenant of business property has the right to use the outside of
the part of the building occupied by him for a business sign. Further,
when the sign space, to which several tenants have the right, is for
their business purpose properly and reasonably used, by some of them
to the exclusion of the remainder, the former having prior possession
will not be enjoined from such exclusive use at the suit of the latter.
Obviously, these cases decide the rights of a tenant of a building to use
the outer walls for signs, and not the rights created by an express lease
of space for signs.
In advising a client who wishes to lease wall space for his sign-
board. I would suggest drawing up an instrument in the form of a lease.
While the courts have been inclined to call the lessee's rights either an
easement in gross or a license, the form of the lease is the most prac-
tical for stating terms of that license. In some cases, when the parties
drew up leases, the language showed clearly the intention of the parties
that such instrument should have all the import of a lease, but still the
courts held that they were really not, rather were mere irrevocable
licenses. However, even though this fiction is attached to the lease, I
would advise its use in this matter, because all the rights of the parties
7 19 0. CC. N. S. 371, 22 A. L. R. 803 (1885).
8 90 Dec. Rep. 789, 22 A. L. R. 803 (1887).
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can be stated in it more readily. The most important interest of the
lessee is that the license shall not be revocable at the will of the licensor.
This can be protected in a lease by a covenant providing that the
license cannot be revoked until the end of the term, unless the parties
actually rescind. Such a license is all the lessee really needs. He does
not need exclusive possession to carry out his purposes, nor does he
want any profits from the land of the lessor. Thus a carefully drawn
lease including a good consideration for the use would protect the rights
which a lessee is seeking.
Illinois
In Illinois the case of long standing on this point is Willoughby v.
Lawrence.9 This case held that an agreement to build a fence around
certain lands, in consideration that the builder shall have the right to
use "all the surface of the fence" for advertising, includes the right to
use the inside of such fence; and such right includes the incidental
rights of entry upon such premises, and access to the inside. It includes
a right of way for such purpose, which is a servitude upon the land.
Thus, if I agree with a person that I should build a fence on his land,
paying the cost and reserving to myself the right to use the surface of
the fence for advertising, purposes this carries with it the right of entry
upon the land to make use of my primary right to use the fence.
This case treats such a grant as more than a mere license. They held
that there was a valuable consideration; namely, the building of the
fence on the grantor's land; thus the grant must be treated as more
than a mere license. The case further states that for this reason a court
of equity will treat this as a burden upon the land of the grantor.
A contract conveying the use of fences on land for advertising pur-
poses is an instrument relating to chattel real and is entitled to record.
If the instrument is on record it will serve as constructive notice to any
subsequent purchaser or occupier. Hence, the case points out if the
owner enters into a covenant subjecting the land to an easement or
personal servitude and the land is later sold to one having either actual
notice or the constructive notice as mentioned above, the said pur-
chaser will take the premises subject to and bound by the covenant.
This covenant will be enforced in equity whether or not it is one, which
in law, "runs with the land."
This, being a right in and upon certain lands, not annexed to the
use of other land, is a right in gross, and not appurtenant. That is,
this right is not granted because of the use of, or to permit or aid the
use of the neighboring land so it is not an appurtenant right in gross.
There is no dominant and servient tenement relationship.
9 Willoughby v. Lawrence, 116 Ill. 11, 4 N. E. 356 (1886).
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R. J. Gunning Company v. Cusack,'0 was the next case involving
such rights. One Schilling signed a contract with R. J. Gunning Com-
pany whereby the latter, for the consideration of fifteen dollars, was to
have exclusive rights to the west wall of a building for advertising pur-
poses. This right was to extend for a period of three years.
About a year and a half later this same Schilling contracted with
Thomas Cusack and Company whereby the latter, in consideration of
fifty dollars, was to have the right to use the same wall space for ad-
vertising. This agreement was to run for one year with agency having
the right to renew the contract on the same terms.
After painting each other's sign out four times the appellee seeks
to enjoin the appellant from interfering with the sign of the former.
The court here reiterated the principle set up in 'Willoughby v.
Lawrence."- The right to use the wall was a burden of servitude in
the nature of an easement, carrying with it the right to such access as
might be necessary to make the burden of value. Thus, everything else
being according to law, the contract signed with the R. J. Gunning
Company is binding upon Schilling and he had no authority to grant
the same rights to the Thomas Cusack Company.' 2
In Booth v. Gaither,'3 the plaintiff in error leased premises consist-
ing of an auditorium and hall thereto from the street, but the lease did
not include one-story stores on the front of the same lot. Defendant in
error leased these from plaintiffs, in error, landlord. There was a blank
space of wall above the stores on the street front. The lessor granted
the use of the space to the plaintiff in error for one year for advertising
purposes.
The plaintiff in error proceeded to paint his advertisement above the
store of the defendant in error when the latter prevented him. The
former seeks to enjoin him from preventing the completion of the ad-
vertisement. After a preliminary injunction was dismissed the plaintiff
in error appealed and received a reversal.
The court held the right to this space was a property right and the
owner may grant the use of it to another. The person receiving the
right will be entitled to protection in the use of same by an injunction.
In Cusack v. Gunning System 14 the agreement was construed as a
contract. It said that a valuable consideration, namely ten dollars for
the right to paint the sign on the wall for one year, passed and there-
fore it was a legal contract and that it was to be applicable as it was
intended by the parties to the contract. It is clear that the contract
10 R. J. Gunning Co. v. Cusack, 50 Ill. App. 290 (1885).
11 116 Ill. 11, 4 N. E. 356 (1886).
12 This case was decided in favor of the Cusack Co. for a different reason.
13 BalUington Booth v. Charles A. Gaither, 58 Ill. App. 263 (1887).
14 Cusack v. The Gunning System, 109 Ill. App. 588 (1903).
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continued in force for one year. Thus, as a contract it is not revocable
at will as a mere license.
In Cusack Company v. Mann,15 it was held that where the com-
plainant had, if not an easement, a burden of servitude in the name
of easement for six years, he was entitled to injunction relief to prevent
interference with his right to place a bulletin board upon the wall of
a certain building.
Now, turning from the cases, just what would be the correct ad-
vice to one who sought advertising rights on a wall and roof? If I were
advising a person seeking those rights I would, of course, want to make
it possible for his advertisement to remain on the wall until the ex-
piration of the term. I would want to make it possible for him to re-
ceive the protection of the court if the landlord or some third person
attempted to oust him or his rights. Now, how could these rights be
protected? From the cases in Illinois it would seem that any agree-
ment wherein the grantee paid the grantor a sufficient consideration
for the privilege of using the walls for advertisement? would become
binding upon the grantor. I believe that in Illinois if the grantor and
grantee expressed the consideration in the agreement and. expressed the
length of the terms that the agreement was to last the court would
treat it as any other contract and not as mere license, revocable at will.
Of course, the grantee could be absolutely sure of his rights and ob-
tain a lease. This, however, gives him more than he actually needs. The
lease grants to the advertising agency an interest in the landlord's wall.
This he does not necessarily need, but he would be absolutely sure that
his rights could not be revoked at the will of the owner of the realty.
Michigan
Apparently the Michigan courts have had little occasion to pro-
nounce upon the question, for a diligent search under the three head-
ings of landlord and tenant, licenses, and easements, reveal few cases
on "all fours" with a fact situation involving advertising on the land,
roof, or wall of another. Consequently, I will set out the law as it has
been judicially determined, and then, in the light of that law, show how
it is possible to protect a prospective client.
The basic case in Michigan, still in effect today, and cited in later
cases is that of Morrill v. Mackman.16 The case is important, not be-
cause it directly affects the question involved, but because it defines
the terms with which we will deal and which terms and definitions are
used today in Michigan law. The court in that case defined a license as:
"a permission to do some act or series of acts on the land of the licensor
without having any permanent interest in it. The license is founded on
15 Cusack Co. v. Mann, Tagney and Hudson, 160 III. App. 649 (1911).
16 Levi Morrill v. Robert Mackman, 24 Mich. 279 (1872).
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personal confidence and is therefore revocable and not assignable." The
court defined an easement as "a right which one proprietor has to some
profit, benefit, or lawful use, out of, or over, the estate of another pro-
prietor." It vests a qualified possession (in the owner thereof). And in
Michigan, a mere non-user will not destroy an easement, although a
non-user plus adverse use of the servient estate will extinguish the
easement.
17
Further, the court went on to define a right which was not a license,
and apparently not an easement (for they failed to call it such). "When
something beyond the mere temporary use of the land is promised, and
the promise is not founded on personal confidence, but has reference
to the ownership and occupancy of other lands, and is made to facilitate
the use of these lands in a particular manner, and for a definite period,
so that the right to revoke at any time would be inconsistent with the
evident purpose of the permission, the interest is something more than
a license." 18 Thus, by definition, signs and wall advertising could be
any of three things in Michigan: a license, an easement, or a lease
(Morrill v. Mackman 19 defining tenancy in the ordinary way). As to
what right is actually conferred however, we must look at the cases.
The principle case in Michigan defining the rights of one erecting a
sign or using wall space for advertising is Forbes v. Gorman.20 In that
case the nature of the right to use walls for advertising purposes was
declared not to be an easement but rather a mere license, revocable at
the caprice of the licensor (subject probably to how extensive improve-
ments have been made).21 As this is an important case, it would be well
to set it out in more detail: Plaintiff leased to X, and provided in the
lease that X "shall be privileged" to erect and maintain a sign on the
outside of the building or on the top of the roof. X assigned to the de-
fendant Gorman who contracted with defendant Walker and Company
to place a liquor sign on top of the building. Plaintiff sues for an ac-
counting of the profits which Gorman has realized on the rental of the
sign to Walker and Company on the ground that the lease only per-
mitted Gorman to put up signs connected with the business of X or
his assigns. Defendant denies such construction of the lease. The court
gave three holdings:
1. A lessee, in the absence of restrictions, acquires the right to use
all of the premises including the walls, both outer and inner, for all
purposes not inconsistent with the lease, and may put any sign or signs
on the walls which work no injury to the freehold.
17 Day v. Walden, 10 N. W. 26 (1881).
18 Levi Morrill v. Robert Mackman, 24 Mich. 279 (1872).
19 Levi Morrill v. Robert Mackman, 24 Mich. 279 (1872).
20 123 N. W. 1089 (1909).
21 Forbes v. Gorman, 123 N. W. 1089 (1909).
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2. The lessee was not entitled to sublet his right to erect a sign to
others for profit, but was only entitled to put up a sign on the roof in
connection with his own business.
3. Where an assignee of a lease which authorized an erection of a
sign on the roof of a building, leased that right to another, and where
the landlord's agent informed the assignee that he had no right to erect
a sign, and where the assignee had not informed the landlord of his
intention or that he was to receive any compensation from the owners
of the sign, he could not claim that the landlord was estopped to object
thereto.
22
This case was cited in H. B. Earhart v. Haw,28 which held that a
tenant, who without objection of the landlord, erected a sign on vacant
land not included in the lease, gets nothing more than a revocable
license under the circumstances. Thus far we have seen that the right
to use wall space for advertising is a mere license; 24 that even where
the right was set out in a lease, it amounted to a personal privilege or
license granted by lease, and will be protected only insofar as the
covenants of the lease expressly protect the right. 25 And that you get
nothing but a revocable license when you erect a sign even without the
objection of the landlord.
26
To clinch the point that the Michigan courts tend toward calling the
right a license and only protect it as such, I cite Lewis v. Baxter
Laundries,27 where what purported to be a lease to create the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant was held to be a license. The court held
there that a writing purporting to "let and lease and give" "exclusive
permission" to erect and maintain signs on the roof was a license rather
than a lease. Flying in the face of the obvious intention of the parties
(to create the relationship of landlord and tenant), the court said: "The
writing, in the form of a lease, did not confer possession of the premises,
but gave a mere permission under the owner to have and maintain a
sign or signs on the roof." 28
There thus seems to be a general tendency in the court decisions to
take a strict view of this matter and not allow sign rights to attach to
land either as an easement or a lease. This is clearly evidenced by the
fact that in Michigan such a right has never been declared an easement,
and where that which purported to be a lease was declared a license. Ap-
parently then, the only way to protect a client is by express stipulation.
Recognize the fact that the court may construe your agreement to be
22 Forbes v. Gorman, 123 N. W. 1089 (1909).
23 H. B. Earhart Inc. v. Haw, 251 Mich. 11, 231 N. W. 103 (1930).
29 Forbes v. Gorman, 123 N. W. 1089 (1909).
25 Forbes v. Gorman, 123 N. W. 1089 (1909).
26' H. B. Earhart Inc. v. Haw, 251 Mich. 11, 231 N. W. 103 (1930).
27 Lewis v. Baxter Laundries Inc., 254 Mich. 16, 236 N. W. 239 (1931).
28 Lewis v. Baxter Laundries Inc., 254 Mich. 216, 236 N. W. 239 (1931).
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a license, but make it as difficult as possible for them to so do. Draw
the agreement up in the form of a lease, giving exclusive possession,
designating the parties as lessor and lessee respectively, stipulating
against revocation, and placing the option of renewal in the hands of
your client. Even this, however, it seems, will not rid the judicial mind
of their objection to calling such agreements leases - the objection that
there can be no letting of a space with less than three dimensions. Note
however, that in the first holding of Forbes v. Gorman,2 9 the court in-
timated that they would give rather adequate protection to wall ad-
vertising, in the absence of restrictions to the contrary.
It may be noted in conclusion that Michigan has two statutes deal-
ing with highway advertising and highway signs. Generally they state
that no person shall erect signs along the highway without the con-
sent of the Highway Commission, 30 and no person shall place signs on
trees which grow within the limits of the public highway. 31
John W. Hackett, Jr., Ohio
James E. Diver, Illinois.
James C. Daner, Michigan.
STATE TAXATION AND THE RIGHT OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO
REGULATE CoMmERcE.-What rights do the states have to tax? What
rights does Congress have in the regulation of commerce? If, in the
exercise of these separate rights, there should be a transgression by one
sovereignty upon the rights of the other sovereign body what would be
the result? These questions have been burning issues throughout the
some odd one hundred and sixty years of our government. Yet, today
the answer to these questions is more complicated and confusing than
ever before.
With the steady expansion of our country, coupled with improved
transportation, communication, and "big business," there rose ac-
cordingly a need for increased regulation and control by the federal
government. Thus, chiefly under the "Commerce Clause" of the United
States Constitution,' the arm of federal regulation stretched forth into
new fields of regulation as the situations have demanded. With this
expansion of the federal government, the states have been forced to
give up many of their sovereign powers to meet the demands of a
changing society. Thus, today the states, fighting vigorously to main-
29 Forbes v. Gorman, 123 N. W. 1089 (1909).
30 Henderson, Michigan Statutes Annotated, § 9, 1405.
31 Henderson, Michigan Statutes Annotated, § 9, 355.
1 Article 1, Sec. 8, cl. 3.
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tain their status as individual sovereigns, cling doggedly to the right
which is the backbone of their existence - the right to tax. And, to
date the federal government has favored this right of the states to tax.
2
However, with the ever increasing powers of the federal government
under the "Commerce Clause," - the question will soon be presented
for judicial decision - to what extent does liability for state use, sales
or income taxes constitute a grounds for immunity from Congressional
regulation of Interstate Commerce?
This article purports to suggest a possible answer to this all impor-
tant question in the light of previous decisions made by the courts.
Right of Congress to Regulate Commerce.
Congress derived its right to regulate commerce from the Coiistitu-
tion of the United States, "to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." 4
But, it became the duty of the judiciary to define and clarify the
power of Congress under the "Commerce Clause."
In the early case of Gibbons v. Ogden,5 commerce was described as
follows: "Commerce is traffic, but it is something more; it is inter-
course. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and
parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing
rules for carrying on that intercourse."
The case of Adair v. United States 6 makes some distinctions be-
tween interstate commerce and intra-state commerce when the court
says, "Commerce among the several states comprehends traffic, inter-
course, trade, navigation, communication, the transit of persons, and
the transmission of messages by telegraph, - indeed every species of
commercial intercourse among the several states, - but not that com-
merce 'completely internal which is carried on between man and man,
in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and which does
not extend to or affect other states'."
But, the term commerce has taken on new interpretation, and be-
cause of the changes in society, commerce has been extended to tele-
graph extensively used in commerce and goveriumental function. Thus,
telegraph has been held to be an integral part of interstate commerce
and thus may be regulated by Congress.7 Radio has also been held to
be a proper subject of regulation under the "Commerce Clause." 8
2 Dykstra, Textbook on Government and Business, § 150 (1939).
3 Article 1, Sec. 8, ci. 3.
4 Article 1, Sec. 8, c. 3.
5 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 1 (1824).
6 208 U. S. 161, 52 L. ed. 436, 28 S. Ct. 27 (1908).
7 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Co., 96 U. S. 1, 24 L. ed. 708
(1878).
8 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond and Mortgage Co., 289
U. S. 266, 77 L. ed. 1166, 53 S. Ct. 627 (1933).
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Congress has plenary powers in the regulation of interstate com-
merce, but one must keep in mind that the commerce regulated by the
Congress must be interstate commerce, or foreign commerce, or com-
merce with Indian tribes, and also the regulation must not violate the
"Due Process Clause." 9
An example of a case where Congress overstepped its bounds in
regulation of interstate commerce is the classic child labor case.' 0 In
this case Congress attempted to regulate child labor by placing specific
restriction on companies using child labor in production and shipped
in interstate commerce. The court, held child labor to be a purely local
matter to be controlled by the several states exclusively.
Again, in the National Industrial Recovery Act case, it was held
Congress had no power to regulate a function which was essentially
local in character."
The problem, what constitutes "due process" came before the court
in the case of Davidson v. Board of Administration of New Orleans.
12
The court found that an affirmative definition of "due process" was
impossible and a definition was limited to "judicial inclusion and ex-
clusion." The thing regulated could not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious and the means selected must have a real and substantial re-
lation to the object which is sought to be obtained.
In a recent case, 13 the court found that the requirement of making
the railroad company give pensions to 146,000 persons, some of whom
had been gainfully employed by other companies, amounted to "taking
the property of one and bestowing it upon another" and this amounts
to a violation of the "due process clause." 14
Thus, generally it must be said that the power of Congress to reg-
ulate interstate commerce must be limited in cases vhich violate the
fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States,15 also where
interstate commerce is only indirectly affected, 16 and because inter-
state commerce has not started or is at an end,17 also where the tenth
amendment of the United States Constitution is violated. 18
9 U. S. Constitution, 5th Amendment.
10 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
11 Schechter Poultry Co. v. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 79 L. ed. 1570, 55 S Ct.
837 (1935).
12 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. ed. 616 (1877).
13 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 79 L. ed. 1468,
55 S. Ct. 758 (1935).
14 U. S. Constitution, 5th Amendment.
'5 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312, 37 L. ed. 463, 13
S. Ct. 622 (1893).
16 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U. S. 330, 79 L. ed. 1468,
55 S. Ct. 758 (1935).
17 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. ed. 1160, 56 S. Ct. 85
(1936); U. S. v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 80 L. ed. 477, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
18 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
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From these decisions, the reader should not be led to believe that
the power of Congress to regulate commerce is substantially limited.
Through, the power to regulate commerce Congress developed the
right to regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. This
power is exemplified most clearly in a recent Tennessee Valley Authority
case; here the court held that the Tennessee Valley Authority, a fed-
eral agency created by federal authority had an implied right to dispose
of the produce of the enterprise. It was alleged that the government
could only use this energy for navigation or war operations. But, the
court held the federal government could dispose of this power as it saw
fit. The court says ". . . And, it would hardly be contended that, when
the government reserves coal on its lands, it can mine the coal and
dispose of it only for the purpose of heating public buildings or for
other government operations ... we think the same principle is appli-
cable to electric energy." 19
Congress has also grasped the power to regulate certain things in in-
terstate commerce, that are incidental to the power to regulate com-
merce. Congress has taken on certain protective powers or police pow-
ers, so called. Among these are the power of Congress to regulate lot-
tery tickets, 20 securities, 21 adulterated and misbranded foods, drugs,
cosmetics, 22 and stolen automobiles. 23
Another field of government regulation is seen in goods which may
be local in character but nevertheless in the flow of interstate com-.
merce. Cases which were upheld upon the "Flow Doctrine" found their
basis from the case of Swift and Company v. United States,24 here
the court held that cattle and other animals shipped from the producer
to the stock yards where they were sold and butchered then sent on
to a consumer are in interstate commerce throughout this transaction.
The court says, "commerce among the states is not a technical legal
conception but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When
cattle are sent for sale from a place in one state with the expectation
that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when
in effect they do so, with only the interpretation necessary to find a
purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly re-
curring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce
among the states, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident
of such commerce." The "Flow Doctrine". was also followed in Staf-
ford v. Wallace 25 and the Grain Futures Act.
26
19 Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S. 288, 80 L. ed. 688, 56 S. Ct. 466 (1936).
20 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, 47 L. ed. 492, 23 S. Ct. 321 (1903).
21 Jones v. S. E. C., 298 U. S. 1, 80 L. ed. 1015, 56 S. Ct. 654 (1936).
22 Dykstra, Textbook on Government and Businesi, p. 152 (1939).
23 Brooks V. U. S., 267 U. S. 432, 69 L. ed. 699, 45 S. Ct. 345 (1925).
24 196 U. S. 375, 49 L. ed. 518, 25 S. Ct. 276 (1905).
25 258 U. S. 495, 66 L. ed. 735,42 S. Ct. 397 (1922).
26 City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S.1, 67 L. ed. 839, 43 S. Ct. 470 (1923).
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Congress has taken another step forward in the regulation of com-
merce under the "Commerce Clause" by regulating to protect com-
merce. A leading case is the National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
and McLaughlin Steel Corporation. In this case the defendant is
charged with a violation of the act by unfair labor practices which dis-
criminated among laborers and labor unions. The defendant alleges
that these activities are purely local and not subject to Federal regu-
lation. But, the court held ". . . Although activities may be intrastate
in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essen-
tial or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and ob-
structions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that con-
trol." 27 Other later cases which elaborate on this principle are: Santa
Cruz Fruit Packing Company v. National Labor Relations Board 28 and
Fansteel Metalurgical Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board.29
It has been held the Congress may regulate intrastate commerce when
said commerce obstructs or interferes with interstate commerce. This
concept is clearly set forth in the famous "Shreveport Rates Case" 30
and the "Wisconsin Rates Case." 31 The principle derived from these
cases is in effect that where interstate rates are conflicting with inter-
state commerce commission rates so as to obstruct or prejudice inter-
state commerce commission rates take precedence to the exclusion of
the intrastate rates.
State's Right to Tax.
Now, what rights do the states hold as sovereign in regard to taxa-
tion? It has been said, "The power of taxation is as fundamental to the
existence of the state governments as it is to the federal, and the grant
of that power to the federal government does not conflict or inter-
fere with taxation by the states. Ordinarily, this power in the two gov-
ernments is concurrent and each may, by its own laws and for its own
purpose, levy taxes upon the same subject at the same time." 82
Although one is aware that the power of the state to tax in its own
realm is plenary, yet, there are certain restrictions placed on the state's
right to tax, namely, the Fourteenth Amendment s8 and a tax which
is an undue burden on interstate commerce.
27 301 U. S. 1, 81 L. ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
28 303 U. S. 453, 82 L. ed. 954, 58 S. Ct. 656 (1938).
29 98 F. 2d 375 (1938).
80 Houston, East & West Texas Ry. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342, 58 L. ed.
1341, 34 S. Ct. 833 (1914).
81 Ry. Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563,
66 L. ed. 371, 42 S. Ct. 232 (1922).
32 Dykstra, Textbook on Government and Business, § 150 (1939).
38 U. S. Constitution.
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In regard to the due process violation by the state,3 4 the case of
Brown Forman Company v. Kentucky,85 the court says, "A very wide
discretion must be conceded to the legislative power of the state in the
classification of trades, callings, businesses, or occupations which may
be subjected to special forms of regulation or taxation through an ex-
cise or license tax. If the selection or classification is neither capricious
nor arbitrary, and rests upon some reasonable consideration of differ-
ence of policy, there is no denial of the equal protection of the laws."
(See a later case in point.) 36
It is also a general rule that states may regulate commerce by taxa-
tion when the goods are not a part of interstate commerce.
This power is illustrated where the journey has not yet commenced.
In Coe v. Errol,87 where logs had been cut in New Hampshire for ship-
ment to Maine and the state taxed the logs as the mass of state prop-
erty, the court held that the state had acted correctly, for the state may
tax property within the state before commerce had actually commenced,
"But this movement does not begin until the articles have been shipped
or started for transportation from the one state to the other .... Until
actually launched on its way to another state, or committed to a com-
mon carrier for transportation its destination is not fixed and certain."
Also, if the journey is ended the states may tax. This principle came
to the front in the case of Minnesota v. Blasius, where cattle were pur-
chased by one and kept in pens for watering and feeding. While the
cattle remained there the state taxed them as the great mass of state
property. The court held this to be proper, saying, "Where property
has come to rest within a state, being held there at the pleasure of the
owner, for disposal or use, so that he may dispose of it either within
the state, or for shipment elsewhere, as his interest indicates, it is
deemed to be a part of the general mass of property within the state
and it is thus subject to its taxing power." 38
It has been held that states may tax property even though in inter-
state commerce where there is no burden on interstate commerce which
is excessive. This power is exemplified in a license tax on auto cara-
vans,89 and where the state is merely taxing to pay upkeep and policing
of harbors.
40
Further, it has been shown a state may tax the privilege of operation
and production within the state even though the organization operates
34 U. S. Constitution, 14th Amendment.
35 217 U. S. 563, 54 L. ed. 883, 30 S. Ct. 578 (1910).
86 Alaska Fish Salting and By-Product Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 65 L. ed.
489, 41 S. Ct. 219 (1921).
37 116 U.S. 517,29 L. ed. 715, 6S. Ct. 475 (1886).
88 290 U. S. 1, 78 L. ed. 731, 54 S. Ct. 34 (1933).
39 Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407, 80 L. ed. 1245, 56 S. Ct. 756 (1936).
40 Clyde IUallory Lines v. Alabama State Docks Commission, 296 U. S. 261,
80 L. ed. 215, 56 S. Ct. 194 (1935).
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extensively in interstate commerce. The Utah Power and Light Company
v. Pjast,41 the court said that a tax upon electricity production in Utah
and subsequently transported to other states was taxable by a state
as a privilege of production of power. Thus, here a privilege tax by a
state was held valid.
Likewise, in the Oliver Iron Mining Company v. Lord,42 the court
held that the state may tax ore mined in Minnesota for interstate com-
merce under the states right to tax the privilege of mining. It is a gen-
eral principle, now, that states may tax the privilege of production and
occupation within a state even though the production is to be sold in
interstate commerce and is an integral part of interstate commerce and
thus may be regulated by Congress under the "Commerce Clause." 43
Recent Decisions.
First, it is well to consider some of the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act.44"Congress says, "Sec. 2 (a) The Congress hereby finds
that the existence in industries engaged in Commerce or in production
of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to the mainte-
nance of a minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being of workers (1) causes commerce and the chan-
nels instrumentalities of commerce to be used to spread and perpetuate
such labor conditions among the workers of the several states; (2)
burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; (3) con-
stitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; (4) leads to
labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow
of goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly fair market-
ing of goods in commerce.
"(b) It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through the
exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the sev-
eral states, to correct and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the con-
ditions above referred to in such industries without substantially cur-
tailing employment or earning power." The Fair Labor Standards Act
is far reaching in its control over local affairs as well as those things
purely interstate commerce. The Act not only regulates wages and
hours, but also has a provision described as "Oppressive Child Labor"
as meaning, "A condition of employment under which (1) any employee
under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than
a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own
41 286 U. S. 165, 76 L. ed. 1038, 52 S. Ct. 548 (1932).
42 262 U. S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929,43 S. Ct. 526 (1923).
43 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 71 L. ed. 1049, 47 S. Ct.
639 (1937); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission of the State of
Washington, 302 U. S. 90, 82 L. ed. 68, 58 S. Ct. 72 (1937); Western Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 82 L. ed. 823, 58 S. Ct. 546 (1938).
44 29 U. S. C. A. § 201.
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child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an
occupation other than manufacturing or mining) in any occupation, or
(2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is
employed by an employer in any occupation which the Chief of the
Children's Bureau in the Department of Labor shall find and by order
declare to be-particularly hazardous for the employment of children
between such ages are detrimental to their health or well-being."
It was questionable after the passage of the Fair Labor Standards*
Act whether or not the act would be declared constitutional for the
courts had previously declared Congressional regulation of Child Labor
by the "commerce clause" to be unconstitutional 45 and also the reg-
ulation of local industries dealing in interstate commerce where it was
held that Congress had no power to regulate labor conditions as these
conditions were purely local in character.4 6 However, recently the Fair
Labor Standards Act was held constitutional both as to the provision
regulating wages and hours and the provision dealing with the child
labor section.
4 7
Even before the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Courts
showed an inclination to allow Congress to regulate commerce to pro-
tect interstate commerce from possible burdens or obstruction. By this
protective theory Congress gained the power to regulate local labor
conditions in companies dealing in interstate commerce.
In the case of the National Labor Relations Board v. Jones,48 it was
alleged that the defendant had used unfair labor practices in violation
of the National Labor Relations Board law. The defendant alleges
that the acts are purely local in character and cannot be regulated by
the federal government. The court says, "Although activities may be
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control
is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
destructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that con-
trol."
Another case 49 holds substantially the same even though only thirty
per cent of the shipment of the produce of citrus fruits was in inter-
state commerce. There was a strong dissent in the Jones Case on the
theory that the majority did not overrule the Carter Case 5o and the
dissent felt this decision could not be reached without overruling the
45 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
46 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. ed. 1160, 56 S. Ct. 855
(1936).
47 U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
48 301 U.S. 1,81 L. ed.893,57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
49 Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S. 453, 82 L. ed. 954,
58 S. Ct. 656 (1938).
50 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 80 L. ed. 1160, 56 S. Ct. 855
(1936).
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Carter Case. Thus, the supreme court had made two decisions which
contradicted each other, and yet the last decision did not overrule the
first according to the majority opinion.
However, when the test of the Fair Labor Standards Act came in
Darby Case 51 the supreme court of the United States definitely gave
Congress the power to regulate to protect interstate commerce. The
Darby Case is an epochal decision where the general constitutionality
was upheld of the Fair Labor Standards Act, holding Congress had
the power to prohibit both the shipment in interstate commerce of goods
produced in violation of the wage hour standards of the Act and the
actual production of such goods for interstate commerce. This decision
upheld the Act against attacks based on a violation of the "commerce
clause," the fifth and tenth Amendments of the Constitution of the
United States. In rendering an opinion the court says, "The motive
and purpose of the present regulation is plainly to make effective the
Congressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce
should not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution
of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competi-
tion is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which
the commerce flows. The motive and purpose of a regulation of inter-
state commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the ex-
ercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which
the courts are given no control ... whatever their motive and purpose,
regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional pro-
hibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the
commerce clause." The court then spoke specifically on the Child Labor
phase of the Act, where the court speaks of the classic case of Ham-
vier v. Dagenhart,52 saying, "The distinction on which the decision was
rested that Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limit-
ed to articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious
property-a distinction which was novel when made and unsupportable
by any provision of the Constitution - has long since been abandoned."
Going further the court says, "The conclusion is inescapable that Ham-
mer v. Dagenhart was a departure from the principles which have pre-
vailed in the interpretation of the commerce clause both before and
since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had
has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled."
Thus, from this decision the power of Congress to regulate to pro-
tect interstate commerce, even where the thing regulated is purely local
in character, is definitely established.
If, then, Congress has this extended control of local state businesses,
will these businesses be immune from state taxation? To answer this
question one must look to the courts and view the decisions where
state taxes on interstate instrumentalities are concerned.
51 U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
52 247 U. S. 251, 62 L. ed. 1101, 38 S. Ct. 529 (1918).
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A difficult situation is presented where an interstate commerce car-
rier purchases fuel outside of the taxing state and brings it into the tax-
ing state and stores it for future use in interstate commerce. The state
has a "use" tax and seeks to tax the fuel. The question revolves around
the meaning of the term "use" in interstate commerce, whether storage
is use. The court held that a tax imposed on storage and withdrawal.
which precedes use in interstate commerce and is not void but a valid
use tax and the fuel is subject to the tax.53
Also, where a purchase was made out of state and no sales tax was
paid and the article then was brought into another state it may be sub-
ject to the latter state's use tax.
5 4
In the case of Cooney v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Co.,5 5 an annual license tax was placed on all telephones whether in
interstate commerce or in intrastate commerce. The court held: this
was a privilege tax or occupational tax and was valid. The court said,
"There is no question but that a state may require payment of an oc-
cupation tax of one engaged in both intrastate, or interstate commerce."
Generally, it may be said that a use tax is valid even on a company
operating in interstate commerce unless there is a direct burden on in-
terstate commerce.
In the case of Interstate Transit Incorporated v. Lindsey rG the
court says, "The tax is proportioned solely to the earning "capacity of
the vehicle. Accordingly, there is here no sufficient relation between
the measure employed and the extent or the manner of the use to
justify that the tax was a charge made merely as compensation for the
use of the highways by interstate commerce busses."
In regard to the validity of a state sales tax, one should look to the
late case of Joseph D. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,
57
a 1939 case. In this case the defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation
engaged in the manufacture of coal in Pennsylvania. The company does
have a sales office in New York, but when contracts selling coal were
made the coal was delivered directly from Pennsylvania to New York
purchasers. New York had a two percent sales tax on receipts from
every sale of tangible personal property sold within the city. The
seller, a Pennsylvania corporation, here has been taxed by New York
city on shipments of coal which have arrived in New York and are
53 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 77 L. ed. 730, 53
S. Ct. 345 (1933); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 77 L.
ed. 1155, 53 S. Ct. 591 (1933).
54 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc., 300 U. S. 577, 81 L. ed. 814, 57 S. Ct.
524 (1937).
55 294 U.S. 384, 79 L. ed. 934,SSS. Ct. 477 (1935).
56 283 U. S. 183, 75 L. ed. 953, 51 S. Ct. 380 (1931); Also: Sprout v. City
of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 72 L. ed. 833,48 S. Ct. 502 (1928).
57 309 U. S. 33, 84 L. ed. 565 (1939).
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awaiting delivery to the purchaser. The defendant alleges that the tax
is an undue burden on interstate commerce and is therefore unconsti-
tutional. In finding the tax to be valid the court found that:
(1) The coal had come to rest in New York the end of its interstate
journey.
(2) The coal thus became a mass of the state's property for tax pur-
poses.
(3) The tax was non-discriminating.
(4) The tax was not an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce.
Further the court says, "If as a guide to this decision we look to the
purpose of the commerce clause to protect interstate commerce from
discrimination or destructive state action, and at the same time to the
purposes of the state power under which interstate commerce admittedly
must bear its fair share of state tax burdens . . . we can find no ade-
quate ground for saying that the present tax is a regulation which in the
absence of Congressional action the commerce clause prohibits." Fur-
ther the court says, ". . . we can find no adequate basis for distinguish-
ing the present tax laid on the sale or purchase of goods upon their
arrival at destination at the end of an interstate commerce journey from
a tax which in a like fashion may be laid on the property itself."
From the majority opinion there is a strong dissent by Mr. Chief
Justice Hughes: "The pressure of mounting outlays has led the states
to seek new sources of revenue and we have gone far in sustaining state
power to tax property and transactions subject to their jurisdiction de-
spite incidental or indirect effects upon interstate commerce. But,
hitherto we have also maintained the principle that the states cannot
lay a direct tax on commerce."
The dissent goes on to point out that if New York could tax this
property, Pennsylvania could too, and this would lead to multiple tax-
ation, an undesirable result.
Notwithstanding the dissent it seems to be established that a state
sales tax is valid even though the goods were from interstate com-
merce.
Gross income taxes present another interesting problem, for the tax
in these cases is not at the end of the interstate journey as the sales
tax but rather the tax is on the gross receipts from interstate and intra-
state commerce.-
An interesting case in this respect was the American Manufacturing
Company v. St. Louis.58 The tax here was a tax imposed as a condition
of the grant of a license to carry on business. The amount of the tax was
to be computed on the basis of the gross receipts of the company re-
ceived from both intrastate and interstate business. The appellant
58 250 U. S. 499, 63 L. ed. 1084 (1918).
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urges that this tax is an unfair burden on interstate commerce and is
therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The tax
read as follows: "On the privilege of manufacturing measured by the
gross receipts."
The court found the tax to be valid saying, "In our opinion, the
operation and the effect of the taxing ordinance are to impose a legit-
imate burden upon the. business of carrying on the manufacture of
goods in the city; it produces no direct burden on commerce in the
goods manufactured, whether domestic or interstate, and only the same
kind of incidental and indirect effect as that which results from the
payment of property taxes or any other and the general contribution
to the cost of government. Therefore; it does not amotint to a regula-
tion of interstate commerce." The court further said, ". . . we hold
that the tax in question is a tax upon the privilege of pursuing the
business of manufacturing these goods in the city of St. Louis; that
when the goods were manufactured the obligation accrued to pay the
amount of the tax represented by their production when it should be
liquidated ... "
The Indiana gross income case 59 should be compared with the
Missouri case. In the former, the appellant is an Indiana corpora-
tion and maintaining its main place of business within the state. The
corporation sells eighty percent of its produce outside of the state of
Indiana. Shipments are made from the factory and payments are made
to the home office in Indiana. The Indiana Gross Income Act requires
this company to pay a gross income tax based on its gross income from
both interstate and intrastate business. The appellant alleges this tax
creates a direct burden on interstate commerce and is invalid. The
court sustained the appellant's allegation; and the fact that the tax
was non-discriminatory and general does not save it from being a direct
burden on interstate commerce. The court says, "It is because the tax,
forbidden as to interstate commerce reaches indiscriminately and with-
out apportionment, the gross for both interstate and intrastate activi-
ties that it must fail in its entirety so far as applied to receipts from
sales interstate." Another case reaches the same result.6 0
Another gross income tax case 61 held that a gross income could be
collected from purely intrastate receipts but could not be collected
from interstate receipts. Here, again, the "apportionment rule" was
followed.
Another interesting case 63 held that a state could tax an advertising
firm on gross receipts even though some of their ads and circulation was
59 J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 82, L. ed. Adv. 870,
58 S. Ct. 913, 117 A. L. R. 429 (1938).
60 Fisher Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S. 650, 80 L. ed. 956,
56 S. Ct. 608 (1936).
61 James v. Dravio Construction Co., 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937).
62 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 82 L.
ed. Adv. 548, 58 S. Ct. 546, 115 A. L. R. 944 (1938).
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outside of the state. Here the court said, "The bare fact that one is
carrying on interstate commerce does not relieve him from many forms
of state taxation which add to the cost of his business. He is subject to
a property tax on the instruments employed in the commerce .. .
and if the property devoted to interstate transportation is used both
within and without the state a tax fairly apportioned to its pse within
the state will be sustained .... Net earnings from interstate commerce
are subject to income tax ...and if the commerce is carried on by
a corporation a franchise tax may be imposed, measured by the net
income from the business done within the state, including such portion
of the income derived from interstate commerce as may be justly at-
tributable to business done within the state by fair method of appor-
tioninent.... All of these taxes in one way or another add to the ex-
pense of carrying on interstate commerce and in that sense burden it;
but they are not for that reason prohibited."
Upon the basis of the cases discussed, it is very questionable whether
or not state use, income, or sales taxes will create an immunity from
Congressional regulation of interstate commerce.
From the recent decisions,63 one must be at once aware that Con-
gress has gone even further under the Congressional power to regulate
commerce. Congress now has the power to regulate in order to protect
interstate commerce. This in effect gives Congress the power to regulate
the local wages and hours, and child labor of a company operating in
"interstate" commerce.
Yet, while the courts have given this increased power to Congress
in the *regulation of commerce, they have rather consistently respected
the states rights to tax.64 As we have seen, a sales tax has been upheld
even though the goods were in interstate commerce and the sales tax
was levied on the sale of said goods.6 5 Here, the goods had reached
their destination and were taxable.
Then, in the gross income cases 66 where the tax declared invalid
as a direct burden on interstate commerce, the dissenting opinion by
Mr. Justice Black suggested that the Indiana Gross Income Act would
perhaps not have been declared invalid if the tax had been written as
"on the privilege of manufacturing measured by the total gross receipts"
instead of designated as "a tax, measured by the amount or volume
63 U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941); Opp Cotton Mills
v. Administrator of Wages & Hour Division of Dept. of Labor, 61 S. Ct. 524, 312
U. S. 126, 657 (1941).
64 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 303 U. S. 250, 82 L. ed.
Adv. 548, 58 S. Ct. 546, 115 A. L. R. 944 (1938).
65 Joseph D. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33,
84 L. ed. 565 (1939).
66 J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 82, 82 L. ed. Adv. 870, 58 S.
Ct. 913, 117 A. L. R. 429 (1938).
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of gross income." This shows that if the tax had been written as a
privilege tax it would be valid,8,3a according to Justice Black.
The apparent determining factor in these state taxes which are de-
riving revenue from vehicles of interstate commerce is whether or not
there is a direct burden on the interstate commerce.
Since, it is up to the courts to determine whether the burden is
direct and an obstruction of interstate commerce, and the courts seem
to favor both state taxes and regulation by commerce, as is seen in
both the McGoldrick Case 17 and the Darby Case.68 Thus, to carry
out both of these desires the courts will probably decide that a business
may be subject to state taxation and at the same time the business will
be subject to Congressional regulation for interstate commerce reasons.
A possible situation where this problem would arise is where a busi-
ness has paid the Indiana Gross Income Tax, and now is being regu-
lated by the Fair Labor Standards Act. In this situation, if the courts
are consistent with their present policy and trends, they will allow state
taxation and yet subject the same business to the Fair Labor Standards
Act. (See this recent case.) 6 9
Of course this conclusion still remains in the realm of speculation,
but it -will be interesting to see what interpretation the courts will give
when the problem is presented.
James H. Neu.
TAXABILITY OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS WORKING FOR THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. - The Federal government, in its policy of ex-
pansion of national defense, has seen fit to carry out a large part of its
activity by means of private contractors. An interesting example of
this is the building of so-called defense-housing projects, whereby the
government contracts to have houses built for occupancy by workers in
the vital defense industries, the government retaining ownership of the
premises. The problem to be dealt with here is whether or not the
state, wherein such projects are situated, may levy taxes upon the con-
struction of such projects.
This question was decided by the United States Supreme Court in
relation to the construction, by a private contractor, of an army camp.
It arose in the attempt by the state to levy a sales tax on a person sell-
66a Wood Preserving Co. v. Indiana, 114 F. 2d 992 (1941); 26 IIl. L. Rev. 1,
p. 113 (1941).
67 Joseph D. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33,
84 L. ed. 565 (1939).
68 U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 657, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
69 Wood Preserving Co. v. Indiana, 114 F. 2d 992 (1941).
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ing materials to the contractor for use in the construction of the camp,1
and in its attempt to levy a use tax upon the contractor for materials
bought outside of the state and used in the construction of the camp.
2
In both instances the state was allowed to collect the tax, such collection
not constituting an infringement by the state on the immunity of the
Federal goVernment from state taxation.
It may be said at the outset that the two cases represent but another
step by the United States Supreme Court in its policy of broadening
the scope and sphere wherein a state may exercise its taxing power. A
principal case in this regard was the Supreme Court's upholding a state
in the imposition of a state income tax on the salary of an employee of
the Federal Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 3 the Court ruling that
such did not impose an unconstitutional burden upon the Federal
government. In another instance wherein the facts were more nearly
analogous to those in ihe Curry case, the plaintiff was under contract
to the Federal Government to build flood-control levees on the Missis-
sippi river.4 In that case the United States Supreme Court refused to
enjoin the collection of a Louisiana gasoline tax levied upon the plain-
tiff, an independent contractor, for the large amounts of gasoline he
used in performing the contract, holding that if the state had the right
to tax the machinery, tools, etc. which the plaintiff used in the work,
it could unquestionably tax the gasoline used by him. In another
similar case the United States Supreme Court refused to enjoin the col-
lection of a West Virginia gross receipts tax levied upon the plaintiff,
an independent contractor, under contract with the Federal Government
to build locks and dams upon the Kanawha and Ohio rivers, so long
as the tax was confined to receipts from work done in the state.5
To retum to the problem presented in the King & Boozer case and
the Curry case, the court relied upon the terms of the contract to- de-
termine if the state could levy the tax. By the contract, the contractor
was to purchase all materials in his own name and was liable for the
payment of all payrolls. Upon payment for such, he was to present
proof to the Federal Government of such payment and it was to re-
imburse him for his expenditures. For his services, the contractor was
to receive a fixed amount of compensation, hence, the term, "cost'plus
a fixed-fee contract." The court determined that if the contractor was
an agent of the United States, the state could not levy the tax, whereas
if he were not an agent, it could levy the tax. On the basis that the
1 State of Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941).
2 . Curry v. United States, 62 S. Ct. 48 (1941).
3 Graves v. People of State of New York, O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 59 S. Ct.
595 (1939).
4 Trinity Farm Const. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U. S. 466, 54 S. Ct. 469 (1934).
5 James, State Tax Commissioner of West Virginia v. Dravo Contracting Co.,
302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208 (1937).
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contractor's primary liability for purchases removed him from the status
of an agent, the court ruled that the state might levy the tax, in spite
of the fact that in the contract the government agreed to reimburse
him for all state or local taxes paid by him, and that the government
exerted, for practical purposes, complete control over the construction
work. In view of the direct and substantial burden placed upon the
Federal Government by its contractual obligation to pay all state and
local taxes, the agency relationship may be drawn aside, and it is evident
that the Federal Government is paying state taxes in the exercise of
its governmental function.6  The Court justifies this in saying, "So far
as such a nondiscriminatory state tax upon the contractor enters into
the cost of the materials to the government, that is but a normal incident
of the organization within the same territory of two independent taxing
sovereigns." 7 (italics mine) The Court holds that any judicial view
to the contrary as "no longer tenable." 8 Without passing on the ques-
tion since it did not arise in the case, the Court infers that if Congress
wished or contemplated that the contractor here should have been re-
lieved from the state taxes, it should have passed appropriate legisla-
tion to that effect. 9
From the cases herein mentioned it may be concluded that states by
way of a use tax, sales tax, gasoline tax, income tax, or gross receipts
tax, may levy upon the business done by an independent contractor
with the United States government. The remaining problem is the ex-
tent of the relief of the independent contractor by way of reimburse-
ment from the Federal government. The government contracts to re-
imburse the contractor for all state and local taxes which the contractor
may be required to pay on account of the contract. Undoubtedly the
government would reimburse for any state sales, use, or gasoline tax paid
by the contractor. The reimbursement of gross receipts tax presents a
different problem in so far as it does not directly result from performance
of the contract. If the contractor submits an invoice for materials pur-
6 As to the Federal government's paying state taxes in the exercise of its
governmental function, see Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber
Co., 62 S. Ct. 1 (1941), where the court says, "The federal government is one of
delegated powers, and from that it necessarily follows -that any constitutional ex-
ercise of its delegated powers is governmental." In that case it was held that
the Federal Land Bank was not liable for a North Dakota sales tax which accord-
ing to the North Dakota Supreme Court was a liability of the purchaser to the
seller. The bank bought building materials with which to repair property acquired
by it in mortgage foreclosure. The vendor of such materials seeks to recover the
tax from the bank.
7 State of Alabama v. King & Boozer, 62 S. Ct. 43 (1941).
8 Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, Knox, Atty. Gen., 277 U. S. 218,
48 S. Ct. 451 (1928); Graves, Governor of Alabama v. Texas Co., 298 U. S. 393,
56 S. Ct. 818 (1936).
9 But see Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 62 S. Ct.
1 (U. S. 1941), wherein it was held that Congress can constitutionally immunize
from state taxation a Federal Land Bank, in the furtherance of its lending functions.
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chased, the sales, use, or gasoline tax will appear on that invoice.10 Such
a tax follows the purchase of materials directly into the contractor's
ledger. In the case of a gross receipts tax, however, the problem is dif-
ferent. In Indiana the gross receipts tax is collected quarterly. It does
not appear on an invoice for the purchase of materials and it will not ap-
pear on any record of a paid payroll when such are submitted for re-
imbursement. The sales or use tax arises because materials are pur-
chased for the contract whereas the gross receipts tax arises because
the government is paying the contractor for his previous expenditures.
The gross receipts tax is on the receipts thus received and not on what
the contractor has expended. It appears not unlikely that the govern-
ment may refuse to pay the contractor for what he is required to pay
the state because of his reimbursements received. Admittedly, accord-
ing to the contract the government desired the contractor to have a
fixed compensation for his services. But, unless the government de-
termines voluntarily to reimburse the contractor for the amount of gross
receipts tax paid on the whole contract, it seems at least questionable
if the contractor could recover for such under the contract."
Richard F. Swishe?.
TAXES FOR USE OF HIGHWAYs ON MOTOR VEHICLES OPERATING IN
INTERSTATE COmzRE.-Much of a state's taxing policy is taken up
with the subject of highways. Taxing vehicles on the basis of their use
of state roads is a lucrative source of income to the several states. Mod-
em means of travel and communication has brought about a volume
of inter-state traffic, so that frequently the taxing policy of a state has
tended to restrain inter-state commerce by imposing unreasonable
burdens on motor vehicles engaged therein, in violation of the com-
merce clause of the constitution. However in order not to be imposed
on, a state may exact reasonable fees for the use of its highways pro-
vided that the tax imposed is not unreasonable, no more than a rea-
sonable compensation for use and maintenance of the state's roads and
further that the tax is not discriminatory.
10 The procedure in securing reimbursement is for the contractor to have a
government auditor approve an invoice or payroll for payment. The contractor
then pays the invoice or payroll, and upon approval of the expenditure by govern-
ment auditors, the invoice is listed on a "bureau voucher" which is submitted to
the government for reimbursement.
11 The whole problem presented here might have been eliminated if the con-
tract had been written so that the government, and not the contractor, had been
liable for the payment of payrolls and for purchases of materials, and so that
such payment would be made by the government and not the contractor. It would
seem that a larger clerical force would not be required and the amount of the
state tax could be saved.
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Various forms or devices have been devised by the states to exact
such a tax. Thus states have imposed taxes for use of their highways
on the basis of mileage,' horsepower,2 capacity,3 seating capacity, 4 flat
rate,5 ton mile,6 weight.7 The justification for the exaction of such fees
is that the state can demand a quid pro quo in return for the use of its
highways, a reasonable amount for the maintenance and upkeep of its
roads. It has been held constitutional to impose a flat rate for the
privilege of using highways as in Georgia v. Public Service Commis-
sions.8 The Georgia legislature 9 had imposed an annual tax on domes-
tic and interstate carriers operating motor vehicles for hire. The ap-
pellant claimed that the tax was discriminatory because local carriers
used the highways more extensively than appellant, an interstate car-
rier. The court held that the tax was not invalid under the commerce
clause since the fee was for the privilege of using the highways as ex-
tensively as the carrier willed. Such a burden, the court said, was not
unreasonable or oppressive. The court followed the reasoning of Hicklin
v. Coney 10 where it said that one who receives a privilege without
limit is not wronged by his own refusal to enjoy it as freely as he may.
The court in the opinion referred to the administrative difficulties of
imposing a tax on the basis of mileage covered by a vehicle.
Further instance of the state's power to exact a reasonable fee for the
upkeep of highways is the late case of Rocky Mountain Lines v. Coch-
ran." The 1939 Nebraska legislative session 12 imposed an equaliza-
tion fee on motors using fuel not subject to the then already existing
motor vehicle tax laws. To adequately maintain sniooth hard surfaced
highways the state of Nebraska imposed on mQtor vehicles a twofold
tax; one a registration fee graduated according to capacity and weight
and the other a "gasoline tax." In 1939 the plaintiff purchased three
diesel engines which burned oil. Plaintiff in his interstate business used
also gasoline burning trucks. He made six to seven miles a gallon on
the gasoline operated motors, paying five cents a gallon tax on the gas-
' Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 48 S. Ct. 230, 276 U. S. 245, 72 L. ed.
551, affirming (D. C.) 19 F. 2d 256 (1928).
2 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160, 61 L. ed. 222, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30
(1916).
3 Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554,47 S. Ct. 702, 71 L. ed. 1199 (1927).
4 N. Transportation Co. v. Bellevue, 215 Ky. 514, 285 S. W. 241 (1926).
5 State v. Oligney, 162 Minn. 302, 202 N. W. 893 (1925); Am. Transit Co.
v. Phila., 18 F. 2d 99 (E. D. Pa., 1927).
6 Iowa Motor Vehicle Ass'n v. Commission, 207 Ia. 461, 221 N. W. 364 (1929);
State v. Railroad Commission of Wis., 196 Wis. 410, 220 N. W. 390 (1928).
7 Camas Stage Co. v. Kozer, 104 Ore. 600, 209 P. 95 (1922).
8 Georgia v. Public Service Commission, 295 U. S. 285, 55 S. Ct. 709, 79 L.
ed. 1439 (1935).
9 Const. art. 1, sec. 8, ci. 3; Laws Ga. 1931, Ex. Sess., pp. 102, 105, 108, sec-
tions 4, 7, 17, 18.
10 290 U. S. 169, 173, 54 S. Ct. 142, 78 L. ed. 247 (1933).
11 299 N. W. 596 (Nebr., 1941).
12 Nebraska Laws 1939, Ch. 80.
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oline. Motors burning oil ran nine miles to the gallon, and the plain-
tiff paid no tax on the oil. To exact a reasonable compensation for use
of the highways of the state by such motor vehicles as the plaintiff's
diesels, the 1939 legislature imposed an equalization fee on non-gas-
oline burning commercial trucks, the amount of which was to be twice
the amount of the registration fee. The court held that the tax, which
amounted to $1320 on three diesels, was not unreasonable; and being
not unreasonable as to the oil burning trucks, the defense of its being
discriminatory could only be availed of by the gasoline burning trucks.
The policy of the courts has been to respect state legislation and
presume it to be constitutional, not substituting its own judgment for
that of the legislature unless the statute is clearly unreasonable. 18 How-
ever this general policy of the court does not preclude the interstate
operator's raising the question of constitutionality. Only one case, that
of Central Transfer Company v. Commercial Oil Company,14 has denied
the ability of an interstate operator to raise the question of constitution-
ality of a statute.
Under a state's police power taxes affecting motor vehicles may be
imposed in the interest of the public welfare to prevent crime and fraud.
Thus in a recent New York case of Marquardt v. Adduci 15 a solid
fuel license tax was held to be constitutional. Defendant, a coal dealer,
was charged with not paying the tax and claims it to be unconstitu-
tional. It was found that the statute imposing the solid fuel tax was
enacted after investigation revealed practices of theft and fraud in the
selling of coal. This case further appealed John v. City of New York, 6
where the court, in interpreting the statute, presumed it to be consti-
tutional. Other statutes designed to effect a similar effect have been
upheld as constitutional under the state's police power in similar cases. 17
Among the forms devised by the states for taxing motor vehicles the
most common is the license fee or tax. In District of Columbia v. Mon-
umental Motor Tours 18 the defendant was charged with the violation
13 Morf v. Bingaman, 56 S. Ct. 756 (1936); Clark v. Poor, 274 U. S. 554,
47 S. Ct. 702, 71 L. ed. 1199 (1927); Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, 173, 54
S. Ct. 142, 78 L. ed. 247 (1933); Sprout v. City of South Bend, 48 S. Ct. 502, 277
U. S. 163, 72 L. ed. 833, 62 A. L. R. 45 reversing 198 Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926) ;
Biadley v. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U S. 92, 95, 53 S. Ct. 577, 77 L. ed.
1053, 85 A. L. R. 1131 (1933); Dixie Ohio Express. Co. v. State Revenue Com-
mission, 306 U. S. 72, 59 S. Ct. 435, 83 L. ed. 495 (1939); Clark v. Paul Gray,
Inc., 306 U. S. 583, 593, 59 S. Ct. 744, 750, 83 L. ed. 1001 (1939).
14 45 F. 2d 400 (1930).
15 28 N. Y. S. 2d 511, 176 Misc. 697 (1941).
16 274 N. Y. 411, 9 N. E. 2d 30 (1937).
17 People v. Perretta, 253 N. Y. 305, 171 N. E. 72, 84 A. L. R. 636 (1930);
Nebbia v. People of State of N. Y., 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940, 89
A. L. R. 1469 (1934) ; Fougera and Co. v. City of N. Y., 224 N. Y. 269, 120 N. E.
642, 1 A. L. R. 1467 (1918).
18 122 F. 2d 195 (1941).
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of a District of Columbia statute.19 requiring operators of motor ve-
hicles, having a passenger capacity- of eight or more in the District of
Columbia, to pay a license tax of $100 a year. Defendant was a Mary-
land corporation engaged in running a sight-seeing bus from Baltimore
to the District of Columbia by way of Annapolis, in the course of
which defendant picked up and discharged its passengers at various
points in the capitol. Defendant replied that the license tax was un-
constitutional and further that its business was not conducting sight-
seeing tours in the capitol. The court failed to sustain these answers,
saying that the tax interferes only with operations from point to point
within the district and further that the tax is not on the business but
that the statute is phrased in terms of "licensing vehicles." The statute
requires the licensing of vehicles rather than the uses or businesses con-
nected with motor vehicles.
In Mot] v. Bingaman 20 a New Mexico statute exacted a fee for the
privilege of transporting motor vehicles on their own wheels for sale
within or without the state. In the instant case the court held that the
statute did not discriminate against a citizen of another state who
transported motor vehicles for. sale in caravans and processions over
the highways of the state. The tax was a reasonable compensation for
the use of the highways since roads over which such caravans pro-
ceeded were more subject to repair through skidding, and congestion of
traffic by such caravan drivers. Serious doubt as to the reasonableness
of the tax might be raised, but evidently the court thought that the facts
of such caravan processions warranted its imposition as a reasonable
charge for the depreciation of highways through such caravan transits.
If there is any discrimination it can only be against the single driver
transporting a car for sale who does not wear the highway as much as
a caravan, and a discrimination therefore of which the appellant could
not avail himself.
A failure to allege that the tax is imposed for the maintenance of
highways may result in the tax being held invalid as in Sprout v. City
of South Bend.2 ' This is a case with a local setting and shows the un-
successful attempt of a city to interfere with interstate commerce in
the case of an interstate carrier. The city of South Bend exacted a
license fee of all those operating a motor bus for hire on its streets. De-
fendant operated a passenger bus between South Bend, Indiana and
Niles, Michigan and claimed exemption from the tax under the com-
merce clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. Although part of de-
fendant's stops were within Indiana, such passengers were required to
'9 D. C. Code, Supp. V, T. 20, § 1731.
20 56 S. Ct. 756- (1936).
21 48 S. Ct. 502, 277 U. S. 163, 72 L. ed. 833, 62 A. L. R. 45 reversing 198
Ind. 563, 153 N. E. 504 (1926).
